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A PROSECUTOR LOOKS AT THE CRIMINAL CODE
RODNEY S. WEBB*

I. INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 1973, the substantive criminal law of the State
of North Dakota was dramatically changed by legislative action
through approval of a Criminal Law Revision Bill.1 The revision,
which is referred to as the "North Dakota Criminal Code" replaces
the majority of Title 12 of our present North Dakota Century Code
and will now be referred to as Title 12.1. Senate Bill No. 20492
relating to "sexual offenses" was approved by the Legislative Assembly on March 28, 1973, and Senate Bill No. 2044- relating to
"tobacco sales to minors" was approved by the Legislative Assembly on March 10, 1973. The three Senate bills, taken together, constitute the most complete revision of the North Dakota substantive
criminal law which has ever been accomplished. The new Criminal
Code becomes effective on July 1, 1975.
Revision of the substantive criminal law of the State was directed
by House Concurrent Resolution No. 3050 during the 1971 legislative
session. This resolution directed the Legislative Council to review
and revise the substantive criminal statutes. It is important to recognize that the 1971 Legislative Assembly felt that the present substantive criminal statutes were the product of piecemeal legislation
over a substantial period of time; that, disparities and inequities
in sentences and sentencing procedures were among chief causes
of the growing disenchantment with the national and state criminal
justice systems; and, that the state system of criminal justice required reviewal with a view toward a comprehensive revision em* State's Attorney, Walsh County, N.D., B.S. 1957, J.D. 1959, Univ. of North Dakota.
Mr. Webb served as a member of the Legislative Interim Study Committee which revised
the North Dakota Criminal Code.
1. Senate Bill No. 2045 reported in N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 116 (1973).
2. N.D. SESS. LAWS ch. 117 (1973).
3. Id., at ch. 118.
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bracing every phase from criminal prevention through correction
and rehabilitation. 4 The Legislative Council was directed to conduct

the review and revision during the 1971-72 Legislative Interim. This
study was assigned to the Committee on Judiciary "B"
5
of both legislative and citizen members.

consisting

It is a generally accepted view that the substantive criminal
law has been in need of substantial revision. Many criminal statutes
are archaic and do not reflect the present social standards of the

state. This need for revision has been reflected in other jurisdictions.6 The law is not and should not be static. It should move
forward cautiously in light of human experience. All of us interested
in the criminal justice system, and particularly prosecutors, want

to embrace a substantive criminal law which is acceptable from
a social point of view. It is submitted that this standard can only
be attained through regular review and revision. However, it is
recognized that all those interested in the criminal justice systems,

and particularly prosecutors, will be hesitant to accept the present
criminal code revision if only because of their unfamiharity with
the New Code. Too often lawyers and judges, as others, resist change
simply because the change is new and demands a new educational
effort. It is hoped that attorneys and judges will view the new
Code as a progressive and innovated approach to problems in the
field of criminal justice and will not discard the revision simply
because of its unfamiliarity.
The revised North Dakota Criminal Code is based upon the
proposed Federal Criminal Code, hereinafter referred to as FCC.
It should be noted that the proposed Federal Criminal Code, finalized
on January 7, 1971, was drafted by a distinguished group of lawyers,
judges and criminologists and provided the starting basis for the
North Dakota code revision. The FCC is annotated with comments

and two volumes of Working Papers have also been published.7

House Concurrent Resolution No. 3050, N.D. SEss. LAWS (1971).
The legislative members of the Committee were: Senators Howard A. Freed, Chairand Jack Page; Representatives Myron Atkinson, Peter S. Hilleboe, James Kieffer,
Murphy and Grace Stone.
Citizen members of the Committee were: Supreme Court Judge Ralph Erickstad;
District Judge W. C. Lynch; Kirk Smith, Judge of Grand Forks County Court with Increased Jurisdiction; Municipal Judge Harry J. Pearce; Professor Thomas Lockney, School
of Law, University of North Dakota; Messrs. Rodney S. Webb and Albert A. Wolf, Attorneys at Law.
6. Substantial revisions of criminal codes have been accomplished in the states of Ohio,
Kentucky, Colorado, Illinois, Idaho and New York, as well as other states. The American
Law Institute has recognized the need for criminal law revision by its publication of the
MODEL PENAL CODE in 1962. Congress has recognized the need for criminal law revision by
formation of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws and the publication by that Commission of the "Federal Criminal Code" in 1971.
7. The Working Papers to the Proposed Federal Criminal Code will provide excellent
background for understandingg the meaning of the law. These documents can be purchased
for the sum of $8.25 by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The National Commission's FINAL REPORT [NA4.
5.
man,
Jack

TIONAL COMMISSION

ON REFORM

OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL

LAws, FINAL REPORT

January 7. 1971 is available from the same source for $1.75.

(1971)]

issued
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Staff comments, which reflect the views of the North Dakota Legislative Interim Committee, will also be published and will provide
a background to determine legislative intent.
This article will attempt to review highlights of the new Criminal
Code and no effort will be made to completely digest all material.
Generally speaking the new Code represents a progressive new approach to the criminal justice system which prosecutors can adopt;
it should be apparent, however, that there are portions of the Code
with which prosecutors will not agree and which perhaps should
be modified if a legislative consensus develops.
II.

SUBSTANTIVE REVISION
A. Sentencing

Perhaps the most important aspect of the Criminal Code revision deals with offense classification." Three classes of felony are
provided and two classes of misdemeanor.9 Prosecutors will be
particularly interested in knowing that the terms "felony" and "misdemeanor" have been maintained; it has been felt that these terms
should be retained in view of their historic meaning and reference
to other sections of the Code, e.g. extradition proceedings. Crime
classification will also facilitate future revision of the criminal law
and uniformity of punishment for similar grade offenses.
The classification system substantially lowers maximum punishments from the present law. Some criticism of the Code will be
made on this account; however, it is submitted that the classification
system is more reflective of present actual sentences. The Code
eliminates the death penalty. Provision is made for extended sentences after a finding that the offender is dangerous, a professional
criminal or a persistent offender.'0
The extended sentence range permits a doubling of the maximum
sentence for imprisonment for Class B and Class C felonies and
in the case of a Class A felony permits a sentence of up to life
imprisonment.
The Code enumerates sentencing alternatives which shall be
considered by the Court." Of particular interest to prosecutors is
the fact that "restitution" is an alternative which the Court may
8.

N.D.

§ 3002.

CENT. CODE §

12.1-32-01

(effective July 1,

1975)

FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,

9. The 1973 Legislature directed a continuation during the 73-74 Interim of the substantive criminal law revision. It should be noted that the continuing study assiggned to
Interim Committee Judiciary "A" has recommended a sixth classification of crime, that
sixth classification being "infraction" which class would not demand any incarceration type
punishment. It has been the Committee's thought that this type of classification would be
in response to the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), which provided for
court-appointed counsel In any indigent case where incarceration could result.
10. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (effective July 1, 1975).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-02 (effective July 1, 1975).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

now consider. Specific statutory reference to restitution should solve
the dilemma that is presently facing prosecutors and defense counsel alike in our Courts since it is recognized that different judges
in different jurisdictions throughout the State have conflicting views
as to their authority to provide for restitution or restoration of
damaged property in their sentences. The use of appropriate work
details is also provided as a sentencing alternative.
The Code also enumerates factors which shall be accorded weight
in making sentence determinations.12 The codification of these factors should be helpful to the Court, without limiting the Court,
and will be reflective of circumstances which the Court is now
taking into account.
Mandatory parole components are provided for in those instances
where an offender has served the whole term of imprisonment following conviction of a felony or a Class A misdemeanor. 13 The
purpose of this provision is to insure that those persons who most
need a period of parole because they may not have been rehabilitated
during imprisonment will serve a period of controlled supervision
following imprisonment. Criticism has been made of our present
system which sometimes releases an unreformed criminal to society
simply because he has "served his debt" and may, in some degree,
be corrected by this provision. The parole board maintains authority
to terminate the mandatory parole if, in their judgment, no need
exists for the continued supervision.
The Code also provides clarification of what civil rights are
lost or retained by a convicted person and dictates the method
14
for restoration of rights.
B.

Standards of Culpability

Five standards of culpability or mens rea are provided in the
Code: 15 "intentionally," which is the highest standard and which
would relate to the most serious criminal offense such as murder;
"knowingly"; "recklessly"; "negligently"; and, "willfully." If a statute does not specify any particular culpability, the standard required shall be "willfully." Proof of any lesser standard of culpability is satisfied by proof of the higher standard of culpability.
An interesting sidelight to the discussion of culpability relates to
the defense of "intoxication" where it is provided that self-induced
intoxication is reckless with respect to an element of an offense
even though disregard, thereof, is not conscious. 6
12. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-04 (effective July 1, 1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,
§ 3101(3).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-10 (effective July 1, 1975).
14. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-33 (effective July 1, 1975).

15.
§

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02 (effective July 1, 1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,

302.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(2)

(effective July 1, 1975).
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C. Defenses
Chapter 12.1-04 of the North Dakota Century Code contains defenses to criminal charges. The Code recognizes that a person under
the age of seven years is incapable of the commission of crime
and bars prosecution of a person less than sixteen years of age
as an adult. This provision is in accord with current North Dakota
law contained in the Uniform Juvenile Court Act. 17
The insanity defense is materially changed in the new Criminal
Code."' Essentially, the Code adopts the legal tests of sanity propounded by the American Law Institute. The mental disease or
defect defense incorporates the M'Naghten Rule followed in North
Dakota and adds the so-called "irresistiblle impulse" theory to the
statutory defense. The statutory definition does not include abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal anti-social conduct.
The Code requires notification from the defendant when evidence
of mental disease or defect is to be submitted as a defense. This
notice provision may be in conflict with Rule 12.2, North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure, since the times provided for are not
consistent. Generally, however, prosecutors need notificalion of an
insanity defense in order to properly prepare for trial.
Chapter 4 also provides a procedure of examination when a
defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks capability
to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own
defense. This provision is essentially procedural and should not have
been included in the Criminal Code. However, the Chapter also
provides for civil commitment of defendants acquitted on grounds
of mental disease or defect. It is felt that by this statute, the
Code recognizes a need for public protection even though conviction
cannot be achieved.
D.

Justification -

Use of Force

Chapter 5 deals with justification or excuse and defines the
scope of the defenses of "mistake of law" and "entrapment." Limits
on the use of force are provided for.1 9 The peace officer's justification in the use of deadly force is too severely limited by this
17.
18.

N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-03 (effective July 1, 1975).

FINAL REPORT,

supra note 7,

at § 503. An alternative to this section, referred to in a consultant's report at page 234 of

the Working Papers, is as follows: "Mental disease or mental defect is a defense to a criminal charge only if it negates the culpability required as an element of the offense charged.

In any prosecution for an offense, evidence of mental disease or mental defect of the defendant may be admitted whenever it is relevant to negate the culpability required as an

element of the offense". The advantage of the alternative would be its integration with the
culpability provisions of the Code; however, this alternative has been opposed on the ground
that it would be confusing and perhaps immoral to attribute "guilt" to a manifestly psychotic person.

19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07 (effective July 1, 1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note 7.
§ 607.
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portion of the Code. The new Code limits the justified use of deadly
force by peace officers to those "felonies involving violence." It
is submitted that a peace officer should not be required to judge
or anticipate the use of violence by a fleeing felon and should
be protected by the same law which protects a private citizen in
his dwelling house or place of work. A private citizen is not as
severely limited in the use of deadly force as is the peace officer
under the provisions of the new Code.
The new Code provides for affirmative defenses which must
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 20 Examples
of this type of defense are mistake of law, duress, and entrapment. 21
The use of the affirmative defense does not reward ignorance since
it requires good faith and puts the burden on the defendant. Entrapment does not exist when a law enforcement agent merely
affords a person an opportunity to commit an offense; some inducement is required. The concept of the affirmative defense, though
it does not relieve the State of its overall burden of proof, does
reflect a realistic view toward prosecution.
E.

Homicide

-

Assault

Chapter 12.1-16 defines three types of criminal homicide: murder,
manslaughter and negligent homicide. Degrees of murder and manslaughter are eliminated from the Code. This is a progressive approach eliminating petty and procedural distinctions in grades of
homicide. The felony-rhurder rule is retained in the Code, but the
misdemeanor-manslaughter rule is omitted. Persons involved in auto
accidents which result in death may no longer be subjected to
manslaughter prosecution, but rather to negligent homicide.
Simple assault, without bodily injury, will no longer be criminal. 22 Assault cases which do not involve injury will be left to
civil remedy.
F.

Theft

All theft offenses in the classical sense and as enumerated in
Chapter 12.1-23 have been combined into one crime simply referred
to as "theft. ' 28 It is submitted that this consolidation is one of
the most significant aspects of the new Code. Gradation of the
20.

N.D.

CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03(3)

(effective July 1,

1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note

7, § 103(3).
21. Considerable committee discussion was had relative to these defenses. It was generally thought that the defense of mistake of law would probably not be available to those
charges which represented acts which in themselves were wrong, constituting "malum in se"
but rather would only be available in the "malum prohibitum" situation.

22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-01 (effective July 1, 1975). FINAL REPORT, supra note 7,
§ 1611. Assault is defined in the Code to include battery and distinction between the
two terms is eliminated.
23. The Code refers to eleven previously distinct offenses, such as larceny and embezzlement, as being combined under the genrp. ter( "theft",
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various degrees of theft has been maintained to reflect values of
the populace of this State. A special section is maintained relating
to the offense of "unauthorized use of a vehicle."2 4
G.

Sex Offenses

Chapter 12.1-20 completely revises the North Dakota law relative to sexual offenses. Generally, sexual contact between consenting
adults will no longer be the subject of criminal sanction. The law
maintains rigorous penalties for sexual contact which involves violence of the person or is committed upon minors, incompetents or other persons when their power to appreciate their conduct or resistance
is impaired. All reference to gender is eliminated from the Chapter;
this is a remarkable change from the present law which generally
referred to a sexual offense victim as being only a female. Children
of less than fifteen years of age are presumed incapable of consenting to any sexual act. Adults are subject to penalty for sexual
contact with children less than fifteen years of age. The crime of
adultery is maintained, but severely limited in its practical application since prosecution can only be had on the complaint of a spouse
and must be commenced within one year of commission. Fornication
is maintained as an offense, but is severely limited in that it is
only criminal when committed in a public place.
The revision of this portion of the law is responsive to the
social values and needs of our society in that it removes from
the field of criminal sanction the "victimless crime" and yet maintains strong criminal prohibition of the forceable and revolting type
of sexual contact.
III. CONCLUSION
The revised Criminal Code cuts the volume of our substantive
criminal law to approximately one-third of its present size. Archaic
and out-of-date criminal offenses are eliminated. New terms and procedures are found in the Code. The new Code will demand an
educational involvement of judges, prosecutors and defense counsel.
Many of the provisions of the new Criminal Code are not in
conformity with this author's views as a prosecutor. However, on
the whole, the new Criminal Code represents the product of great
study on the part of a number of participants from throughout
this State and has been based upon a national study of great merit.
Hopefully the North Dakota Revised Criminal Code will serve
our State well and perhaps be a guide to other states in the revision
of the substantive criminal law.
24. N.D. CEINrT. CODE § 12.1-23-06
§ 1736.

(effective July 1, 1975).

FINAL REPORT,

supra

note 7.

